Escalating Skies: How Iranian Missiles Challenge Western Air Defence Systems
In the aftermath of the February 28, 2026, joint US-Israeli military operation against Iran, global focus has shifted towards the real-world performance of modern air defence networks. The strikes, conducted under the Israeli codename “Roaring Lion” and the US designation “Epic Fury,” targeted Iranian nuclear facilities, leadership compounds, and military infrastructure.
As these operations unfolded, attention turned to the effectiveness of Western air defence systems and China’s exported platforms deployed within Iran. While official narratives from involved parties highlighted operational success, battlefield outcomes and open-source intelligence suggested a more complex reality.
At the same time, Iran’s retaliatory missile campaign demonstrated continued ability to penetrate layered defence networks, including Patriot, THAAD, Arrow, and Iron Dome. This analysis examines specific incidents, operational data, and reported assessments to evaluate these developments.
US-Israeli Strikes Dismantle Chinese Air Defence Systems in Iran
Iran procured HQ-9B air defence systems from China in July 2025 under an oil-for-weapons arrangement. These systems were intended to strengthen Iran’s air defence architecture following weaknesses exposed during the 2025 Israel–Iran 12-day war.
The HQ-9B is marketed as a long-range surface-to-air missile system comparable to the Russian S-300. It incorporates HT-233 engagement radars, YLC-8B anti-stealth radars, and Type 305A acquisition radars. Together, these components form an integrated detection and interception network.
During the February 28, 2026 strikes, these systems were subjected to coordinated electronic warfare and precision attacks. US EA-18G Growler aircraft conducted sustained jamming operations from carrier groups, including deployments linked to the USS Abraham Lincoln. High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles targeted radar emissions.
Reports indicate that four Type 305A radars and two YLC-8B units were destroyed near Tehran and Isfahan. The HT-233 radars were heavily jammed, significantly degrading targeting capability. Iranian state media later acknowledged “technical failures” in air defence activation.
Once radar coverage was disrupted, Israeli F-35 aircraft and US Tomahawk missiles were able to operate with limited resistance.
Neutralisation of HQ-9B Batteries and Network Failures
At least three HQ-9B batteries positioned around Natanz and Fordow were directly struck. Israeli Air Force sorties, involving more than 200 aircraft, targeted launchers, command centres, and data nodes integrated into the HQ-9B network.
The Israeli military described the campaign as its largest operational deployment, referred to as “Operation Genesis.” In addition to manned aircraft, low-cost drones from Task Force Scorpion Strike were reportedly used to saturate remaining defences.
According to Global Defense Corp analysis, compatibility issues between Chinese systems and Iran’s existing data-link architecture limited response speed and situational awareness. These integration challenges compounded the impact of electronic warfare.
The campaign extended into western Iran, where SA-65 systems influenced by Chinese technology were targeted in Kermanshah. Overall, Israeli authorities reported strikes on more than 500 military targets, including air defence assets.
Although Chinese sources on social media denied supplying HQ-9B systems to Iran, multiple independent reports pointed to expanded deliveries during mid-2025.
These operational outcomes reflected earlier concerns raised after India’s Operation Sindoor in May 2025, when Chinese-origin systems deployed in Pakistan failed to prevent missile penetration.
Scale of Israeli Air Operations and Missile Suppression Efforts
On March 1, 2026, the Israel Defense Forces confirmed that the Israeli Air Force had conducted its largest operational campaign against Iran to date. More than 200 fighter aircraft were deployed to strike nearly 500 targets across western and central Iran.
These targets included air defence installations, ballistic missile launchers, storage facilities, and military infrastructure. Hundreds of precision-guided munitions were released with the stated objective of establishing air superiority and degrading Iran’s strike capabilities.
In official briefings, IDF spokesperson Effie Defrin stated that the operation had severely damaged or disrupted the use and production of approximately 1,500 missiles from Iran’s pre-conflict inventory. Israeli assessments had earlier estimated Iran’s missile stockpile at around 2,500 units.
According to Israeli officials, this campaign formed a central component of efforts to reduce the scale and sustainability of Iran’s retaliatory capacity in subsequent phases of the conflict.
Iranian Retaliation Breached Patriot, THAAD, and Iron Dome
Iran’s response involved launching more than 50 ballistic missiles and drones against Israeli territory and US bases in the Gulf region. This campaign built upon tactics employed during the 2025 conflict.
During the 12-day war in 2025, Israel claimed interception rates of approximately 86 per cent. However, independent assessments confirmed that numerous missiles reached designated targets.
Key sites affected included Tel Aviv’s Kirya military headquarters, Nevatim airbase, and the Haifa refinery complex. At least 28 civilians were killed and several hundred were injured. Over 530 ballistic missiles were launched during that period, with 31 impacting populated or strategic areas.
In the 2026 exchanges, similar patterns were observed. THAAD batteries deployed by the US reportedly fired more than 150 interceptors during the earlier conflict, yet could not fully prevent infrastructure damage.
Iran also employed hypersonic missiles such as the Fattah, reportedly equipped with cluster warheads. These weapons utilised manoeuvrable trajectories and high-speed profiles to complicate interception.
Salvo launches, decoys, and mixed-weapon attacks reduced system efficiency. Overload strategies forced defenders to expend large numbers of interceptors within short timeframes.
Attacks on US Bases and Regional Targets
Iran extended its retaliation to US military facilities in the Gulf. Targets included the headquarters of the United States Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
Reports indicated five to six explosions inside protected zones despite Patriot air defence deployments. Although casualty figures were not officially disclosed, damage assessments suggested partial penetration of defensive perimeters.
In May 2025, a Houthi-linked missile supported by Iran breached combined THAAD and Arrow coverage near Ben Gurion Airport. Eight people were injured, and transport infrastructure was damaged.
IRGC General Mohsen Rezaei publicly stated that these incidents demonstrated vulnerabilities in American missile defence coverage, particularly against cluster and saturation attacks.
Iranian Strikes on US Radar Infrastructure in the Gulf
During Iran’s retaliatory strikes on February 28, 2026, launched after US-Israeli operations that resulted in the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranian forces targeted key American radar and communication assets across the Gulf region.
At Naval Support Activity Bahrain, which hosts the headquarters of the United States Fifth Fleet, a Shahed-136 drone and a ballistic missile struck a radar or communication dome. The attack caused partial structural damage amid multiple interceptions. No US casualties were officially reported.
In Qatar, Iranian missiles targeted Al Udeid Air Base, the forward headquarters of United States Central Command. The IRGC claimed that its forces had completely destroyed the high-value AN/FPS-132 early warning radar, estimated at approximately USD 1.1 billion and capable of detecting targets at ranges of up to 5,000 kilometres.
Qatari authorities confirmed that missile debris and intercepted projectiles caused limited damage within the base perimeter. However, widely circulated visual evidence also showed several interception failures and direct impacts. Officials stated that most incoming threats were neutralised and that core operational functions remained intact.
These coordinated attacks underscored the exposure of high-value US surveillance and missile defence infrastructure to precision and saturation strikes, despite layered defensive coverage across the region.
Economic and Strategic Costs of Missile Defence Operations
The financial burden of sustained missile defence has emerged as a major factor in the conflict. Interceptor missiles used by systems such as THAAD, Arrow, and Patriot cost between several hundred thousand and several million dollars per unit.
During the 2025 war, Israel reportedly depleted nearly two years’ worth of THAAD reserves. Replacement required extensive US logistical and financial support.
The conflict resulted in estimated losses of approximately USD 20 billion for Israel. More than 80 drones were intercepted, while interceptor stockpiles were heavily reduced.
Iran’s approach, using lower-cost missiles and drones, created an economic imbalance. The cost-exchange ratio consistently favoured the attacker.
Furthermore, continuous high-alert operations increased maintenance demands and operator fatigue, affecting long-term readiness.
Implications for Global Defence Markets and Strategy
The events of 2025 and 2026 highlight structural limitations in modern missile defence doctrine. Neither Chinese export systems nor Western flagship platforms demonstrated complete reliability under sustained, multi-domain pressure.
China’s HQ-9B, once promoted as a competitive alternative to Russian and Western systems, suffered reputational damage following its performance in Iran and Pakistan-linked deployments.
At the same time, repeated penetrations of Israeli and US defences challenged prevailing assumptions about comprehensive defensive coverage. Official interception claims were frequently contradicted by satellite imagery, damage assessments, and civilian footage.
Iran’s operational approach—using older missile stockpiles to exhaust adversary resources—reflected long-term planning aimed at weakening defensive sustainability before deploying advanced systems.
Evolving Missile Warfare and Defence Realities
The February 2026 escalation reinforced the reality that no air defence system intercepts every threat. Under saturation conditions involving ballistic missiles, drones, and decoys, even the most advanced networks fail to maintain complete effectiveness. Multi-layered systems deployed by Israel and the United States typically record interception rates in the range of 85–95 per cent. However, during heavy and coordinated barrages, a measurable number of projectiles routinely penetrate these defences.
However, the complete destruction of several air defence systems remains undesirable and reflects serious systemic deficiencies, as observed in the case of Chinese-supplied platforms.
Iran’s continued reliance on mixed-age arsenals demonstrated that effectiveness does not depend solely on advanced technology but also on deployment strategy and operational coordination.
As regional tensions persist, future conflicts are likely to involve larger drone swarms, more sophisticated decoys, and integrated cyber-electronic attacks.
In this environment, missile defence will continue to play a critical role. However, it cannot substitute for intelligence dominance, strategic depth, and political stability.
The 2025–26 Iran–Israel confrontation therefore provides a detailed case study in the practical limits of modern air defence under sustained high-intensity warfare.
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