Bangladesh: The Pilot Project of a New Multi-Power Contest

In the aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s fall, Bangladesh conspiracy theories have multiplied across the region. Yet these narratives, dismissed too quickly by some and embraced too eagerly by others, miss a deeper truth. Bangladesh today is not merely navigating a domestic political crisis. It has emerged as the pilot theatre of a new multi-power contest — a silent and intricate struggle where US–China strategy, Pakistan–Turkey ideological activism and India’s security imperatives now collide in real time.

This is not Sri Lanka’s bankruptcy, nor Nepal’s political oscillation. Bangladesh has stepped into a category of its own: a strategic laboratory where major and middle powers are testing influence, access and ideological leverage without crossing the threshold into open confrontation.

This strategic reclassification is visible not only in the manoeuvres of foreign powers but in Dhaka’s own political signalling. The caretaker leadership under Mohammad Yousuf has begun projecting ideas that would have been unimaginable under previous governments. The very act of presenting a map, book or artwork depicting a “Greater Bangladesh” inclusive of parts of India’s Northeast is not cultural nostalgia; it is deliberate political messaging. Why introduce such imagery at this moment? The answer is implicit. It nudges India, provokes a reaction and inserts a new layer of tension into an already crowded strategic environment. In a theatre where every actor is testing limits, even symbolic gestures become instruments of engagement — and Bangladesh’s new leadership appears willing to use them to shape regional moods, or to keep India preoccupied on multiple fronts at once.

A Pre-Engineered Transition: Planned Strategic Laboratory

Bangladesh’s political shift did not emerge from a vacuum. It unfolded along trajectories that several external powers had quietly anticipated, cultivated or encouraged well before Sheikh Hasina’s departure. The transition activated a set of pre-positioned interests rather than creating empty space for opportunism. In many ways, the direction in which events moved was less a reaction to her exit and more the unveiling of agendas that had been waiting for the political moment to turn.

Hasina’s fall therefore did not mark the start of a geopolitical scramble; it marked the point at which a pre-engineered transition slipped into open view. Bangladesh’s strategic geography — sitting at the hinge of the Bay of Bengal, the eastern Indian Ocean and China’s energy corridors — ensured that global and regional powers had already mapped their preferred outcomes.

When the leadership changed, these actors stepped into predetermined pathways. What followed was not improvisation but alignment. The country became a planned strategic laboratory where influence networks, ideological channels, intelligence linkages and military partnerships accelerated with remarkable synchrony. The speed and confidence with which external players adjusted to the new environment revealed that Bangladesh had long been identified as the next competitive arena in South Asia’s shifting power matrix.

The United States: Access Without Bases, Influence Without Ownership

American intentions in Bangladesh have long been examined through a Cold War lens, often leading to simplistic interpretations. But the United States is not pursuing the old model of regime change. Its strategy is subtler. Washington aims for access rather than ownership, maritime leverage rather than fixed bases.

Saint Martin’s Island sits at the centre of this logic. The island’s location offers a natural vantage point for maritime surveillance across key sea lanes used by China. Sheikh Hasina suggested she resisted external pressure over the island. After her departure, the increased presence of American personnel in Cox’s Bazar and adjoining areas has raised questions the interim authorities have not fully addressed.

Joint exercises and humanitarian deployments do not prove covert action. However, the timing suggests that the United States recognised a rare moment to secure influence in a region crucial to its rivalry with China.

Pakistan’s ISI: From Silent Penetration to Open Re-Emergence

Pakistan’s intelligence establishment never left Bangladesh. It simply shifted below the radar during Hasina’s tenure. Islamist groups were monitored, networks were restricted and infiltration was contained but not eliminated.

After Hasina’s exit, Pakistan re-entered the Bangladeshi space with a confidence not seen since the early 2000s. High-level visits, military exchanges and the visible reactivation of dormant networks signal a strategy aimed at reshaping Bangladesh into a political and ideological buffer against India.

Pakistan does not need to control Bangladesh directly. It needs Dhaka to be more porous, more unsettled and more ideologically flexible — conditions that weaken India’s eastern flank. This objective aligns with Pakistan’s long-term doctrine of stretching India across multiple pressure points.

When Interests Overlap: The CIA–ISI Convergence Theory

The most intriguing dimension of the crisis is the possibility that the CIA and ISI may have found momentary alignment of interests. Not collaboration, but convergence.

The United States wants to limit China’s influence and maintain strategic access in the Bay of Bengal. Pakistan wants to weaken Indian influence and revive Islamist-friendly political structures. These goals are not identical, yet they do not conflict.

Bangladesh’s transition offers strategic dividends to both, even if neither cooperated with the other. This is not proof of a joint plot. It is a recognition that modern geopolitics often produces parallel gains for adversarial intelligence agencies.