Ayni Airbase India: The Untold Story of a Base Never Meant for India to Keep
The debate around Ayni airbase India, its withdrawal, and its supposed “loss” for India has re-emerged across television studios, political debates, and social media commentaries. Much of this discussion, however, strips the issue of its historical context and strategic nuance. Ayni was never a permanent Indian base, and India always knew it. It was never comparable to Diego Garcia or any exclusive long-term overseas facility. Tajikistan always retained command, control and sovereignty, while Russia’s military presence in the region meant India’s role remained limited and carefully calibrated. Yet, for nearly two decades, the base offered India a window of opportunity into Afghanistan and Central Asia at a time when the geopolitical winds favoured such cooperation.
To understand the story of Ayni accurately, one must begin with its origins, explore what India built there, examine the regional geopolitics that made it useful, and then finally understand why its relevance naturally declined after 2021. Only then does the complete picture emerge — not of defeat or diplomatic failure, but of a strategic outpost that fulfilled its purpose and then ceased to be necessary.
The Origins: Why India Looked North Towards Tajikistan
India’s interest in Ayni can be traced to the security anxieties of the late 1990s. The Taliban’s rise in Afghanistan, combined with Pakistan’s influence over militant networks operating in the region, created an unstable neighbourhood for India. Overland routes to Afghanistan were blocked by geography and hostile borders. India needed alternative access points to Afghanistan — not for conquest or power projection, but for humanitarian support, intelligence gathering and strategic flexibility.
Tajikistan, by contrast, had emerged from a brutal civil war and was looking for partners to rebuild. The country occupied a critical geographic position. Just a short flight from northern Afghanistan, and within reach of the strategically important Wakhan Corridor, Tajikistan offered India something it lacked elsewhere: proximity without dependence on Pakistan. At the same time, the Northern Alliance — India’s long-time partner against the Taliban — was headquartered not far from Tajik territory. Supporting them required logistical nodes that could function even during regional disruptions.
Thus, Ayni emerged not as an imperial base, but as a product of necessity, geography and mutual interest.
Farkhor Airbase: India’s First Northern Footprint
It is pertinent to recall that before Ayni entered Indian strategic discourse, there was Farkhor. Located about 130 kilometres southeast of Dushanbe, Farkhor became India’s first overseas military footprint in 1998. Yet, much like Ayni later, it was never a full-fledged combat base. It began modestly — a field hospital for wounded Northern Alliance fighters, a repair station for Soviet-origin helicopters, and a limited airstrip whose infrastructure barely met tactical transport requirements.
During the early 2000s, India upgraded parts of the facility to support humanitarian missions and occasional logistical rotations. However, Farkhor never hosted Indian fighter aircraft, nor did it resemble a permanent deployment of combat assets. Its role was shaped by the political sensitivities of the region and by Russia’s dominant influence over Tajik security affairs. Once Ayni — with its longer runway, hardened shelters and better approach corridors — became operational, Farkhor’s importance gradually reduced.
By around 2008, most operational focus shifted to the more modern Gissar/Ayni complex, yet India never fully vacated Farkhor. It retained a quiet, limited presence connected with training exchanges, engineering support and humanitarian assistance. The field hospital, which had been one of India’s earliest soft-power symbols in Central Asia, was formally handed over to Tajik authorities in 2022.
As of November 2025, Farkhor remains India’s only active, low-visibility access point in Tajikistan — a modest “soft-power lily pad” rather than a military base. It sustains diplomatic warmth, technical cooperation and institutional familiarity without the geopolitical complications that later surrounded Ayni.
Armenia: A Strategic Partnership, Not a Military Base
It is also pertinent to clarify that Armenia frequently appears in speculative debates about Indian ‘overseas bases’, yet such claims are unfounded. India maintains no Indian military sites in Armenia — no airstrips, no detachments, no forward deployments. What exists instead is a rapidly expanding defence partnership, aided by technical and training teams associated with equipment deliveries.
Since 2022, Armenia has signed more than USD 1.5 billion worth of contracts for Indian systems — ranging from Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers to Akash air-defence systems, ATAGS howitzers, Swathi counter-battery radars and a suite of anti-drone technologies. These acquisitions mark Yerevan’s deliberate move away from traditional Russian defence dependence, a shift accelerated by Moscow’s distraction in Ukraine and Armenia’s 2020 defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh.
India’s presence in Armenia is commercial, strategic and political — the projection of influence through “Make in India” hardware rather than through the physical burden of overseas bases.
What India Built at Ayni: A Substantial Infrastructure, Not a Permanent Military Hub
When India began upgrading Ayni in the early 2000s, the airbase was in a degraded state. Decades of Soviet-era turbulence and Tajikistan’s civil war had left it partially dysfunctional. India stepped in as a development partner and invested heavily — upgrading the runway, strengthening aircraft shelters, modernising navigation systems, and constructing supporting infrastructure that allowed the airfield to handle larger aircraft.
Yet even with these investments, Ayni was never a base under full Indian command. Tajikistan owned the facility, controlled its access, and decided which foreign military could operate there. Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division was stationed in the country, and Moscow’s strategic influence ensured that India’s presence remained limited and conditional.
Public imagination over the years has inflated India’s role to that of a country operating a full overseas military base, complete with fighter squadrons and a permanent deployment. The reality was far more modest. India never stationed Su-30MKI aircraft at Ayni on a ‘permanent’ basis, despite occasional reports and speculation. There were no Indian combat aircraft permanently parked in Tajikistan. The base never hosted an Indian fighter squadron, never allowed India full autonomy, and was never developed and owned into a Diego Garcia-style hub.
India did station a small number of Mi-17 helicopters at various points, alongside technical staff, security personnel and maintenance teams. But these existed within a framework that acknowledged Tajikistan’s sovereignty and Russia’s strategic primacy.
In other words, Ayni was always a joint-use facility, not a foreign base. Its utility lay not in domination, but in cooperation.
Why Ayni Mattered: India’s Gateway Into Afghanistan (2002–2021)
During the two decades after 2001, Afghanistan became the central theatre for international diplomacy and counter-terrorism. In this environment, Ayni gave India something invaluable: a reliable gateway into a region otherwise closed off by Pakistani geography.
India used Tajikistan as a support node for humanitarian relief, medical assistance, emergency evacuation and contact maintenance with Afghan partners. Ayni’s proximity to the Afghan border meant it could offer operational flexibility during crises. If the situation in Kabul deteriorated, India had a northern fallback option that allowed it to remain engaged in regional stabilisation efforts.
This mattered particularly during the early years of the Afghan Republic, when Indian development projects — schools, hospitals, roads, the Afghan Parliament building, and the Salma Dam — became symbols of trust and goodwill between the two nations. Ayni’s logistical value supported this broader diplomatic and developmental engagement.
It was not an airbase for projecting power, but rather an outpost for ensuring presence.
The Anti-Taliban Alignment: When India, Iran, Russia and the US Shared the Same Strategic Goal
The usefulness of Ayni also stemmed from an unusual geopolitical alignment that existed between 2001 and approximately 2014. For a rare period in history, India, Iran, Russia and the United States all found themselves aligned against the Taliban’s influence in Afghanistan.
Each had different motives. Iran viewed the Taliban with ideological suspicion. Russia feared spillover of extremist groups into Central Asia. The United States was engaged in its post-9/11 war on terror. India sought to counter Pakistan-backed networks and maintain stability in its extended neighbourhood.
This created a shared strategic environment in which India’s presence at Ayni made sense to all parties. Russia tolerated and even facilitated it. Iran saw it as a counterbalance. The Afghan Republic, relying on multi-nation support, viewed India’s presence favourably. There was no conflicting great-power friction that threatened India’s position.
However, geopolitical alignments are never permanent. As the years progressed, priorities shifted. Russia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated. Iran recalibrated its regional role. The Afghan Republic weakened. The Taliban manoeuvred its return to full power. U.S. and NATO forces negotiated their withdrawal from Afghanistan. The convergence that had made Ayni useful slowly dissolved.
The 2021 Collapse of Kabul: When the Original Purpose of Ayni Vanished
The Taliban’s return to power on 15 August 2021 represented a geopolitical earthquake that instantly altered the strategic landscape of South and Central Asia. The anti-Taliban axis that once facilitated India’s presence collapsed overnight. Each major power recalibrated its priorities in ways that rendered India’s northern presence less relevant.
Russia moved swiftly to open channels of communication with the Taliban. China adopted a pragmatic posture, seeing opportunity in economic engagement. Iran shifted its stance, striking a balance between hostility and cautious cooperation. Tajikistan, heavily dependent on both Russia and China, aligned its policy with regional trends. The incentive to maintain a foreign military presence on Tajik soil diminished.
India too recalibrated. Its diplomatic engagement with the new Afghan authorities, however limited, marked a shift away from the earlier structure of relying on anti-Taliban alliances. The reason Ayni was useful — access to Afghan groups opposing the Taliban — ceased to exist.
With the base’s strategic purpose gone, the bilateral arrangements that had governed India’s presence quietly expired around 2021–22. India withdrew its personnel over the next year. Tajikistan naturally resumed full control. There was no confrontation, no eviction, and no loss of prestige. It was simply the end of a chapter whose plot had concluded.
The New Geopolitical Reality: Why Ayni Is No Longer Relevant Today
The most important factor that determines Ayni’s irrelevance is not India’s withdrawal, but Afghanistan’s internal transformation since 2021. The geopolitical map of the region has changed so dramatically that the strategic logic of the past no longer applies.
The Taliban regime, unexpectedly, has developed sharply adversarial relations with Pakistan — the very country that once nurtured, sheltered and supported it. Border clashes along the Durand Line, public accusations, and hostility between the Pakistani military and the Afghan Taliban have altered the fundamental equation of power in the region.
For India, this shift opens possibilities that were unthinkable during earlier periods. A regime that once served as Pakistan’s proxy is now increasingly assertive and unwilling to bow to Islamabad’s demands. This does not mean India and the Taliban are allies — but it does mean India is not locked out of Afghanistan’s political sphere.
Diplomatic conversations, humanitarian engagements, and limited official exchanges between India and the Taliban have already taken place. India re-established a diplomatic presence in Kabul in 2022 to manage humanitarian and development initiatives.
This environment makes Ayni — a distant base operated through multiple layers of foreign influence — far less useful. If engagement with Kabul is possible directly, if India is not facing a Taliban-Pakistan coalition, and if the Afghan theatre is not hostile to India, then the requirement for a northern airbase evaporates.
Some Indian analysts have floated a speculative possibility: that in scenarios where Taliban–Pakistan hostility escalates, India’s access to Afghan territory, or even to an airfield like Bagram for humanitarian or counter-terror coordination, might become more feasible. While such predictions remain uncertain, they highlight one key truth: India’s options today are more flexible than they were in the past.
In such a world, Ayni becomes a relic of an older strategy — not a victim of diplomatic failure.
Finally, Ayni Was a Strategic Investment That Completed Its Life Cycle
When viewed in totality, the story of Ayni airbase India is neither a tale of loss nor of abandonment. It is a reminder that foreign bases seldom last forever, and that strategic footholds serve specific purposes during specific moments in international affairs. India never controlled Ayni. It never used it as a fighter base. It never operated it as a sovereign military hub. It did, however, benefit from it for nearly two decades in ways that mattered for security, diplomacy, and regional engagement.
When the geopolitical context shifted — dramatically and irrevocably — the rationale for Ayni faded. India’s disengagement was quiet, planned, and natural. Today, with Afghanistan in a transformed relationship with Pakistan, with regional powers repositioning themselves, and with India exploring direct engagement channels with Kabul, the northern outpost of Ayni has little remaining strategic purpose.
Ayni was not a failure. It was a successful chapter in Indian strategic history that ended exactly when its relevance did. The base served its time. The region has moved on. So has India.
