The Yemen Question Returns for Pakistan
In late July 2026, Yemen’s Houthi movement (Ansarallah) struck the Saudi-flagged oil tanker Encelia in the Red Sea, causing a fire at the bow, and claimed a second strike on the Layla. The group had days earlier declared a maritime blockade of Saudi ports, citing retaliation for Saudi-backed strikes on Sanaa airport. Oil prices briefly touched US$100 a barrel for the first time since May. With the Strait of Hormuz already heavily disrupted by the broader US-Iran conflict, Saudi Arabia’s alternative export route—the East-West Petroline to Yanbu on the Red Sea and then through the Bab al-Mandeb—came under direct pressure.
Pakistan’s response was swift and unequivocal. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif telephoned Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, condemning the attacks “in the strongest possible terms” as violations of international law that threatened freedom of navigation. He reaffirmed “complete solidarity” with the Kingdom, stating that he, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and the Pakistani nation stood “firmly and resolutely” with Saudi leadership. The Foreign Office issued parallel warnings that hostile acts against Pakistani-flagged vessels or maritime interests would be treated as grave threats potentially justifying the use of force.
This is not abstract diplomacy. It occurs under the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) signed on 17 September 2025 in Riyadh by Sharif and Mohammed bin Salman. Public statements describe the agreement as treating aggression against either country as a matter of mutual concern under a collective-defence framework. However, the full treaty text has not been released publicly. Media and regional defence reporting have suggested that the agreement envisages reciprocal military assistance upon request in response to threats to either country’s security, sovereignty or strategic interests.
According to multiple regional defence reports, Pakistan had by mid-2026 deployed additional military personnel, fighter aircraft, drones and air-defence assets to Saudi Arabia, alongside earlier rotational contingents. Although the precise scale and composition of these deployments have not been officially disclosed, they reflect a significantly expanded Pakistani military presence in the Kingdom.
The question is whether the Houthis’ re-entry into open confrontation with Saudi Arabia truly revives “unfinished business” from 2015—and whether it will force Pakistan into deeper military entanglement.
Decades of Entanglement, Not Opportunism
Pakistan-Saudi military ties predate the modern Yemen conflict by generations. A 1967 security cooperation agreement opened the door for Pakistani advisers and pilots. In 1969, Pakistan Air Force pilots flew Saudi BAC Lightnings to repel a South Yemeni incursion at Al-Wadiah. After the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Pakistani Special Services Group commandos helped retake the site. The 1982 protocol institutionalised large-scale deployments: at peak in the 1970s and 1980s, an estimated 15,000–20,000 Pakistani troops were stationed in the Kingdom, some in brigade combat formations near sensitive borders. During the 1990–91 Gulf War, Pakistan maintained around 13,000 troops and advisers in Saudi Arabia. Training exchanges have remained continuous, with thousands of Saudi officers passing through Pakistani military institutions.
Economic interdependence is equally structural. In FY 2025–26, Pakistan recorded a record US$41.6 billion in workers’ remittances. Saudi Arabia was the single largest source at approximately US$9.78 billion. Saudi cash deposits with the State Bank of Pakistan have repeatedly stabilised foreign exchange reserves, alongside rollovers that have supported Pakistan’s IMF programme. Preferential oil facilities and investment commitments have further strengthened the bilateral relationship.
These ties explain why Saudi requests for support in Yemen have always carried weight—and why refusal carries costs.
The 2015 Precedent: Neutrality with Caveats
In March-April 2015, as the Saudi-led coalition launched Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis after their advance across Yemen, Riyadh sought Pakistani combat contributions including aircraft, troops and naval assets. Nawaz Sharif’s government initially appeared receptive. After five days of joint parliamentary debate, however, a unanimous resolution on 10 April 2015 declared that Pakistan should “maintain neutrality in the Yemen conflict so as to be able to play a proactive diplomatic role.” It simultaneously expressed “unequivocal support” for Saudi Arabia and pledged that Pakistan would “stand shoulder to shoulder” in the event of any violation of Saudi territorial integrity or threat to the Haramain Sharifain.
Domestic calculations drove the outcome: fear of sectarian repercussions inside Pakistan, reluctance to alienate neighbouring Iran, and the army’s existing commitments against domestic militants and insurgent groups. The economic costs were also visible, with Saudi financial support becoming more cautious and Gulf strategic attention increasingly shifting towards India, even as Pakistan strengthened engagement with Iran and deepened its reliance on China.
Why 2026 Is Structurally Different
Three structural changes distinguish the present crisis from 2015.
First, the SMDA converts decades of close military cooperation into a formal mutual-defence framework. In 2015, Parliament could still assert neutrality while offering conditional solidarity. Today, the public language of collective security, combined with Pakistan’s expanded military presence inside Saudi Arabia, narrows the political space for maintaining strategic distance.
Second, the operational context has escalated. The Houthis are no longer a purely local Yemeni force. Sustained Iranian technical support has given them anti-ship ballistic missiles, long-range drones and the ability to threaten the Bab al-Mandeb —the roughly 20-mile-wide chokepoint through which Saudi Red Sea exports must pass whenever reliance on the Red Sea route increases because of disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. Their July 2026 actions directly targeted that strategic alternative.
Third, Pakistan’s economic vulnerability is acute. Remittances equal roughly 10% of GDP. Saudi financial support continues to play an important role in maintaining external stability. Any sustained disruption of Gulf labour markets or regional energy flows would hit Pakistan harder than it did in 2015.
Iran remains the counterweight. The two countries share a roughly 900-kilometre border plagued by Baloch insurgent groups. The January 2024 exchange of cross-border missile strikes demonstrated how quickly mutual accusations over militant sanctuaries can escalate. Bilateral trade has grown to around US$3 billion, with both governments expressing ambitions to expand it substantially. Open hostility would jeopardise both border security and economic cooperation.
Will It Haunt Pakistan—and How?
The risk is real, but not necessarily one of full-scale combat inside Yemen.
The SMDA’s publicly described defensive framework and the 2015 parliamentary resolution both emphasise threats to Saudi territory and holy sites. Houthi attacks on shipping and airports arguably fit that threshold more clearly than the coalition’s 2015 ground campaign. Pakistan has already chosen to maintain an expanded military presence capable of contributing to air defence, deterrence and the protection of critical infrastructure inside Saudi Arabia. Additional requests for reinforcement or maritime security cooperation therefore appear plausible and could prove politically difficult to decline without affecting an economic relationship that remains important to Pakistan’s external stability.
Full offensive participation inside Yemen, however, remains a much higher threshold. Pakistani military doctrine and domestic opinion continue to show sensitivity towards sectarian dimensions and the costs of another prolonged external conflict while the armed forces remain engaged on multiple internal and regional fronts. Islamabad’s parallel efforts to maintain channels with Tehran and its broader interest in regional stability also create incentives to avoid deeper military entanglement.
The more immediate consequence is constrained strategic autonomy: reduced room to act as a neutral broker, greater exposure to Iranian pressure through border tensions or proxy activity, and the domestic political costs of appearing to prioritise Saudi interests. Rising energy prices and any disruption to Gulf employment or remittance flows would deepen those pressures. In a worst-case scenario, gradual mission creep from defensive deployments to more active operational roles could emerge if the wider regional conflict intensifies.
Pakistan has managed this balancing act before by providing training, advisers and defensive support while avoiding large-scale offensive combat. The formal defence pact and the broader regional energy crisis make that calibration more difficult today. Whether the Houthis ultimately draw Pakistan into a deeper role will depend less on the unresolved legacy of 2015 than on how Saudi Arabia chooses to invoke the 2025 agreement and how effectively Islamabad can meet its defensive commitments without crossing into offensive operations that would further strain relations with Tehran.
